

Varieties of Clientelism in Hungarian Elections

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In many elections around the world, candidates appeal to voters using private incentives, including payments, preferential access to services, and threats. The study of these phenomena has been at the center of a rapidly growing literature in political science.¹ These studies have attempted to understand the factors that have contributed to the persistence of electoral clientelism in recent democracies and the consequences of these phenomena for electoral competition and political accountability.

Clientelism is a *quid pro quo* exchange of electoral support for some agreed behavior by a politician or one of their agents, often called a broker. However, this simple definition encompasses a variety of ways that these exchanges can actually be structured. One dimension of variation among clientelistic strategies results from the heterogeneity in the identity of the brokers or political intermediaries deployed by candidates to mediate their relationship to voters. Such intermediaries may include employees of the local administration², employers,³ or brokers hired in on-the-spot transactions.⁴ Clientelistic strategies also vary in how candidates or brokers incentivize voters' electoral choices. Brokers can rely either on positive inducements or on threats of post-electoral punishment of voters that make the incorrect electoral choice. If voters have no choice but to accept the offer made by the politician or broker, such threats are coercive. Previous studies have documented the heterogeneity among different clientelistic strategies. However, we still lack a convincing explanation of the factors that account for the variation in the occurrence of different forms of clientelism.

This article presents a theoretical account of the variation in the use of different clientelistic strategies. We theorize that politicians' decisions to choose between strategies are affected by two sets of considerations. First, politicians may consider the relative supply of resources that can be mobilized to incentivize voters. How easy is it to access state resources as opposed to private resources that are financed either by the candidate or the party organization? Second, politicians consider the informational consequences of different forms of clientelism. Clientelistic strategies allow candidates to send voters signals about their "type," competence, or position on issues. We conceptualize factors that affect how voters react to these informational signals as

“demand-side” considerations. Previous studies have found that voters perceive offers of gifts or goods at elections as signals of “pro-poor concern,” generosity, or electoral viability.⁵ We contend that clientelistic strategies premised on positive versus negative inducements have different informational content. While strategies premised on positive inducements are signals of pro-poor concern, coercive strategies convey the opposite informational content. They signal a candidate’s harshness towards social policy beneficiaries and an implicit policy position that disregards the most vulnerable voters. We argue that these anti-poor signals are particularly attractive in localities where a significant group of voters opposes the beneficiaries of anti-poverty programs and considers them “lazy” or “undeserving.” From the perspective of a candidate, the relative attractiveness of coercion relative to positive inducements depends on the distribution of voter preferences within the locality. Coercion is electorally more attractive if there is a sizeable group of voters in the locality opposing the neediest voters or if there is significant political conflict over the allocation of anti-poverty benefits.

The study of electoral clientelism poses large challenges of measurement. Existing studies have proxied clientelistic strategies using measures of social policy expenditures,⁶ discretion over the allocation of social policy benefits,⁷ or survey-based measures.⁸ Using such methods, current studies have either examined the variation across localities in the use of particular clientelistic strategies or the variation in the characteristics of voters that have been targeted by different forms of clientelism. Empirically, our measurement strategy allows us to combine the strengths of both approaches. We use non-obtrusive survey techniques to measure voters’ exposure to four different types of clientelism. At the same time, we use hierarchical models to examine the variation across localities in the incidence of different forms of clientelism. We depart from existing studies by measuring and analytically explaining the incidence of different forms of clientelism.

Our results show that demand-side factors related to the way that voters interpret the informational signals of different forms of clientelism explain variation in the forms of clientelism that are deployed in rural Hungary. When social conflict is high, meaning that there are large groups of voters who are both eligible and ineligible for the current social policy program, coercive forms of clientelism are more likely, and positive forms of clientelism are less likely. In addition, when the group that is currently benefiting from social policy is larger, policy favors are more likely, and policy coercion is more likely when the group that is currently excluded from social policy is larger. By contrast, factors that should shape local actors’ access to state resources for use in clientelistic exchanges do not explain variation in whether public or private forms of clientelism are used. Overall, these results suggest that more research should focus on how the usefulness of clientelism for office-seeking politicians is shaped by how those transactions are viewed by the general electorate. They also highlight the need to relax the traditionally sharp distinction between clientelistic and programmatic strategies, suggesting that clientelistic exchanges are part of a broader set of campaign messages shaping how voters view candidates.

Disaggregating Clientelism

We will start by clarifying our definition of clientelism before presenting some theoretical predictions about the variation in the incidence of these strategies across localities. Following Hicken, we define clientelistic exchanges as chains of dyadic relationships between politicians, agents, and voters. Behavior in these exchanges is contingent or “quid pro quo,” a contract for electoral support by voters in exchange for some agreed behavior by the agent.⁹

One finds, however, a wide variation in the type of clientelistic exchanges.¹⁰ We propose that clientelism should be disaggregated along two normatively and empirically important dimensions. The first dimension of this variation concerns the type of goods that are offered to voters in clientelistic exchanges. These goods can be either financed out of tax revenues or involve private resources held by individual candidates, parties, or brokers. A wide variety of resources financed by general tax revenues can be used for policy favors, including public sector jobs,¹¹ public services,¹² unemployment benefits,¹³ and food assistance.¹⁴ By contrast, “vote-buying” refers to clientelistic strategies where the goods are not financed out of tax revenues. Goods offered as part of vote-buying exchanges may include money, food, or alcohol.

A second dimension of variation among clientelistic strategies concerns the type of incentives that are used to influence voters. Specifically, we distinguish between positive inducements and negative threats. Positive inducements involve offers of rewards, such as payments in cash or in goods or preferential access to services. Negative inducements involve threats to withhold or withdraw resources that voters expect to receive, or have received. To the extent that voters perceive these resources as a critical part of their livelihood, negative inducements are coercive. Coercion can involve publicly financed resources, such as access to social policy benefits, or private resources, such as employment or land. This distinction builds on a literature in political theory that differentiates positive and negative proposals based on the impact that they have on an individual’s baseline condition or expectations.¹⁵ Threats involve a conditional proposal that leaves the proposal recipient worse off than they expected to be, regardless of whether or not they accept the proposal. Threats are coercive if the threatened party has no reasonable choice but to accept the proposal.¹⁶

Why are these distinctions important? First, forms of clientelism that are based on state resources and structured as coercive threats are normatively more problematic. Coercion is typically viewed as more objectionable because it violates an individual’s autonomy to opt out of an exchange.¹⁷ Recent empirical work has shown that voters perceive coercive forms of clientelism as more objectionable than strategies based on favors.¹⁸ The state vs. non-state dimension is also important because clientelism based on state resources can have much more pernicious consequences for the allocation of social policy benefits and other policy resources than vote-buying.

Hungary, the site of our fieldwork, displays all four types of clientelistic strategies. Like in many other post-communist countries, candidates competing in small Hungarian localities appeal to voters by conditioning access to policy resources of the state in

exchange for political support. Mayors use their discretion over the distribution of a variety of social policy benefits to condition voting behavior. The most important program that has been used for clientelistic exchanges is the National Public Employment Program or “workfare program” (*Magyar Munka Terv*).¹⁹ The workfare program provides benefits that are, in relative terms, more generous than benefits of other social assistance policies. The average income of participants in the workfare program stood at around 75,000 HUF, an amount that was higher than the minimum wage.²⁰

Because of its scope and desirability, the workfare program has become a highly politicized resource in recent Hungarian elections. Access to the workfare program is a source of both promises and coercion. Consider first the use of access to workfare programs as positive electoral inducements, a strategy we have defined as welfare favors. In one locality, a respondent recalled that the “people who wanted to take part in the workfare program were promised employment in exchange for political support. They were told that they would receive support, but then the X on the ballot should be placed in the right spot.”²¹ Another respondent recalled that families who complained for not receiving workfare programs were told that “the ones who do not join the party line will not receive workfare jobs.”²²

Access to workfare benefits is not only granted as a positive inducement, but also used coercively. The threat to take away policy benefits is a powerful electoral inducement because it is a permanent loss of income to voters. We found evidence of such coercive strategies in several localities. In one locality, the mayor convened all workfare employees to a meeting and informed them that they needed to support the candidate favored by the mayor if they wanted to remain in the workfare program.²³ Commenting on this mobilization strategy, one of our respondents noted that public sector employees acted as “multipliers.” Communicating the threat to them was a very effective strategy as they passed on the threat to their families, multiplying the support for the mayor’s candidate.²⁴

Another clientelistic strategy present in the Hungarian context is coercion perpetrated by private actors. In the Hungarian localities where we conducted qualitative research, we found evidence that employers and informal moneylenders were involved as electoral brokers. Moneylenders, who operate illegally in rural Hungary, would mobilize voters with threats to worsen the terms of their loans. In exchange for this service, the moneylenders received forbearance by local authorities, payments, or favors from local politicians. Locality Z in Borsod County was one locality where moneylenders were particularly active in coercing voters. According to one respondent, “the moneylenders persuaded their clients to vote for the current mayor . . . these things are the natural part of the elections.”²⁵ Another informant in the same locality described the power of local moneylenders: “The client system works as a big family where the one who has capital rules the others who owe to them. They cannot refuse if the lenders ask for favors.”²⁶

We turn now to an examination of the variation across localities in the use of different clientelistic strategies. When and why do candidates use these four different

forms of clientelism? First, the existing literature suggests that control of local political institutions should condition whether politicians can use state resources in clientelistic exchanges. We think of these as “supply-side conditions” and predict that these should affect the choice between public and private forms of clientelism. Another set of factors relates to the way that voters perceive and possibly punish candidates who use different forms of clientelism. We call these “demand-side conditions” and argue that voters’ policy preferences and the presence or absence of political conflict within the locality might condition voters’ views of how candidates will perform once in office. We predict that these demand-side conditions should influence the use of positive inducements versus threats because they send different signals about a candidate’s personal characteristics, management style, and policy priorities. Table 1 summarizes our main predictions about locality-level variation in the incidence of clientelism.

Access to Political Resources

A candidate who considers using clientelistic strategies to incentivize voters faces a first choice regarding the type of resources that can be used during their interaction with voters: Should voters be incentivized with policy resources financed by general tax revenues or should they be incentivized using private resources? We conjecture that the choice between different types of clientelism varies systematically across localities and is affected by the availability of state resources.

In localities where politicians can access state resources with relative ease, we conjecture that candidates will prefer to utilize such resources to structure their relationship to voters. By contrast, candidates will turn to clientelistic strategies that use private resources in localities where state resources are difficult to access. These conjectures revert the expectations about the importance of vote-buying in the menu of clientelistic strategies one encounters in the current literature. While many existing studies consider clientelistic exchanges premised on vote-buying as the default strategy used by candidates, we contend that vote-buying emerges only as a second-best strategy, when the political resources of the state are unavailable.

Table 1 Variation across Localities in the Use of Clientelistic Strategies

		Supply-side	
		Access to policy resources of the state	
		Low	High
Demand-side Presence of distributional conflict	Low	Vote-buying (non-state inducements)	Welfare favors (state-based inducements)
	High	Economic coercion (non-state threats)	Welfare coercion (state-based threats)

In our empirical analysis, we consider three contextually relevant variables that might influence the ability of candidates to politicize state resources. In Hungary, workfare benefits tend to flow through local administrations, so the relevant political and institutional conditions for clientelistic exchanges are related to control of city hall. The first variable that we consider is co-partisanship between the mayor in a locality and the incumbent party in national office. A resource asymmetry between incumbent and non-incumbent parties is likely to be present in any political system: incumbent parties tend to control more resources that allow them to incentivize and recruit electoral brokers. Co-incumbency with the national political party not only affects the resources available to a candidate, but also the willingness of brokers to supply effort for clientelistic transactions.

The second variable that may affect the ability of candidates to access state resources is the length of time that a mayor has held office. Longer incumbency is likely to enhance access to state employees who can be mobilized as brokers. Such employees of the local administration, in turn, can mobilize a host of different policies and programs to incentivize voters.

A third variable that may affect access to state resources is political fragmentation in the locality. In localities where government is unified and where mayors encounter a city council with a similar partisanship, candidates should be more likely to be able to politicize state resources. This should not be the case in localities with politically divided administrations. In such cases, city councils and mayors are likely to heavily scrutinize their respective political activities. These “checks and balances” are likely to limit the ability of mayors to politicize state resources. These considerations imply that access to state resources is likely to be higher in localities with unified government.

To sum up, we predict that incumbency, co-partisanship with the incumbent party, and political fragmentation of the city council should increase the likelihood of clientelistic strategies that deploy state resources. They should have no effect, or a negative effect, on the use of clientelistic strategies that deploy private resources. In localities where candidates cannot politicize the services of state employees, candidates should have to turn to private resources to organize clientelistic exchanges. In the vote-buying case, candidates will establish networks of on-the-spot brokers to mobilize voters using in-kind gifts or monetary inducements. Alternatively, candidates can incentivize private actors—such as employers or moneylenders—who control significant economic resources to act as their brokers.

Distributional Conflict and the Choice between Negative and Positive Inducements

We also contend that the choice between positive and negative clientelistic strategies is affected by the way that voters perceive and punish different forms of clientelism. We predict that positive forms of clientelism will be less costly to candidates in communities where there is less conflict over the distribution of resources. When there


is distributional conflict, however, voters should interpret positive forms of clientelism more negatively and be less critical of threats made against groups with which they are in conflict. We refer to this dynamic as “poor versus poor” conflict. These hostilities between groups of poor voters originate in disagreements about the distribution of scarce social policy benefits. We conjecture that the intensity of distributional conflict conditions the choice between strategies premised on positive versus negative inducements.

Antipoverty programs represent an important source of political conflict in many low-income communities. Such programs are often the only stable long-term source of income for many voters in communities where employment opportunities are scarce. The eligibility criteria for these social policy benefits generate an important cleavage between low-income voters. On one side of this distributional divide, one finds persons who qualify for benefits under current rules and who favor the policy status quo or expansion. On the other side, one finds voters who are low-income but excluded from social policy benefits due to demographic or labor market characteristics. Examples of such voters in Hungary are the elderly and the working poor. Such persons are likely to resent beneficiaries of anti-poverty programs and stereotype them as lazy or undeserving.

The ethnic composition of a locality may further accentuate this distributional conflict. The cleavage between Roma and ethnically Hungarian voters is highly salient in Hungary. Roma voters are less likely to participate in formal employment and more likely to retain eligibility for social policy benefits. This ethnic polarization of the labor market reinforces the distributional conflict over access to social policy benefits. Given that the correlation between Roma ethnicity and probability of access to workfare benefits is high, the conflict over access to social policy benefits—which is first and foremost an economic conflict—may take an ethnic dimension.

Figure 1 summarizes the discussion about cleavages in low-income communities. As Figure 1 illustrates, the eligibility threshold of a particular anti-poverty program—in this case the workfare program—creates a distributional conflict within

Figure 1 Poor against Poor Conflict



the locality. On one side of this eligibility threshold, we find people who qualify for antipoverty benefits under existing policy rules. In our empirical analysis we refer to this constituency as the expansion coalition. On the other side of the threshold, we find low-income voters who do not qualify for these social policy benefits. We refer to this group of voters as the retrenchment coalition. The term retrenchment is, inevitably, a short-hand characterization of the complex social policy views of such voters. Due to their inability to access social policy benefits, such voters are more likely to favor a reallocation of benefits, rather than the wholesale elimination of anti-poverty programs.

As discussed above, existing research evaluating clientelistic strategies has documented that clientelism has implications for how candidates are perceived in terms of their personal qualities and policy positions.²⁷ In the extreme, voters' impressions of candidates could update positively, and these informational signals could be the driving purpose of clientelism. Mares and Visconti refer to these informational consequences of clientelism as the ability to "turn vices into virtues."²⁸ We hypothesize that positive and negative inducements have different informational implications about the qualities and policy positions of candidates. Clientelistic strategies premised on positive inducements allow candidates to signal "pro-poor" concern. When candidates or their brokers offer to help voters gain access to social policy benefits, even if access is conditioned on political support, voters see that these candidates are interested in maintaining or expanding the current program. By contrast, coercive forms of clientelism carry different signals about the competency and policy position of the candidate. Coercive clientelism involving threats to reduce social policy benefits can be interpreted by voters as a signal of their willingness to retrench existing benefits or punish undeserving beneficiaries. In using coercive strategies, candidates and brokers pursue two different objectives. On the one hand, candidates seek to capture the vote of these dependent voters and induce them to trade the vote in exchange for access to income. On the other hand, candidates aim to signal a policy position that is anti-poor or anti-workfare. The target audience of such signals is voters opposed to the current allocation of antipoverty benefits, the retrenchment coalition.

The existence of "poor versus poor" conflict over the allocation of social policy benefits and the intensity of such conflict create incentives for candidates to use different clientelistic strategies. In localities where the electoral constituency favoring expansion is large, candidates will find the use of clientelistic strategies based on positive inducements attractive. In these cases, candidates should use the positive forms of clientelism to appeal to voters favoring the current allocation of policy benefits. By contrast, in localities where the electoral constituency opposing social policy beneficiaries is large, candidates should favor clientelistic strategies premised on coercion. Social conflict over social policy may be particularly strong when both of these groups of poor voters are large. If there is a large group of voters that are not eligible for the current social policy program, but they are not frequently confronted with people receiving more benefits than they receive, social conflict may still be relatively low. However, when there is a significant population that is currently eligible

or favored by the program, we expect that an increase in the size of the retrenchment coalition should have an especially strong effect.

To summarize, our explanation of the variation across localities in different forms of clientelism combines both resource-based, or supply-side, and informational, or demand-side, considerations. On the one hand, we conjecture that candidates' access to political resources should structure the choice among clientelistic strategies that politicize private or public resources. On the other hand, the existence of distributional conflict among poor voters over the allocation of policy benefits or employment should affect the choice between coercive electoral strategies and strategies based on positive inducements.

Research Design

Measurement is a critical challenge in the study of illicit electoral practices. Traditional survey methods are of little use in the study of such phenomena. While voters may have experienced some of these illicit political strategies, they may be reluctant to admit their experiences. Such reluctance may be the result of social desirability bias, fear of retaliation from candidates or brokers, or fear of prosecution by anti-corruption agencies for having engaged in illicit and prosecutable activities. One research strategy that allows researchers to more accurately measure the incidence of clientelism is the "list experiment." Traditionally, list experiments were developed to elicit unbiased answers about sensitive political attitudes, such as racism or anti-Semitism.²⁹ In recent years, list experiments have become a widely-used research strategy in the study of electoral fraud and other political irregularities.³⁰

In list experiments, respondents are presented with a list of items and asked how many (as opposed to which) items are true. To capture the incidence of the sensitive behavior, respondents are randomly divided into two groups. Respondents that are assigned to the control group are given questionnaires that include only the non-sensitive item. By contrast, respondents in the treatment group are presented the same list of non-sensitive items given to the control group and an additional item that measures the sensitive behavior. Analysts can infer the incidence of the sensitive behavior in the population by taking the difference in the mean number of items chosen by respondents in the treatment and control groups, respectively.

We designed survey instruments to measure the four forms of clientelism that we defined in consultation with experts on electoral politics and marginalized ethnic minorities. We pre-tested both the instruments for the sensitive behavior and the control items that were included in our list in a number of pilot surveys with Hungarian voters. We conducted three such rounds of pretests, with sample sizes between 100 and 150 voters.

One goal of the pretests was to design the control items on the lists to avoid "ceiling" and "floor" effects. List experiments are supposed to provide plausible deniability to respondents, but if either none or all of the control items are true for a respondent, then they cannot hide their response to the sensitive item. To this end, we used the pilots to identify low-salience control items that were chosen by less than 15

percent of the respondents and high-prevalence items that were chosen by more than 50 percent of the respondents, but that were strongly negatively correlated ($r > -0.7$) such that responses to the control list were tightly centered around one. This was likely to increase the confidence of respondents in reporting truthfully the sensitive behavior, while also reducing the variance in the means estimate for the treatment and control groups. Consider the following example of a list included in our survey:

I am going to read some statements of events that happened or could have happened during the elections. Please recall the elections of 6 April 2014 and tell me how many of these events happened in your locality. You do not need to tell me which ones happened exactly, only how many.

(High prevalence 1) The candidates promised to bring more resources to our neighborhood.

(Low prevalence) One of the candidates was born in our neighborhood.

(High prevalence 2) None of the candidates were interested in our neighborhood; they were only concerned about their own party.

In this article, we report an analysis of four lists measuring clientelistic strategies that we identified as salient in Hungary in preliminary qualitative research. The first sensitive item included in the survey (as part of a list) measures positive inducements based on state resources. The second sensitive item measures coercive strategies that involve state resources. The third sensitive item measures vote-buying, or positive inducements based on private resources, and the fourth measures coercion by private economic actors, in this case moneylenders. The sensitive questions included in our survey that attempted to measure the incidence of clientelistic strategies were worded as follows³¹:

(Public Inducements) I was expecting a favor from the mayor's men if I voted well.

(Public Coercion) I was worried that a family member would drop out of the public works program if I voted wrong.

(Private Inducements/Vote-buying) I was offered a gift, drink, or food in exchange for my vote.

(Private Coercion) I was worried that I would owe more to my creditor, if I voted for somebody he/she did not like.

The survey was administered by a Hungarian survey company in June 2014. Enumerators conducted face-to-face interviews in ninety-three villages in three Hungarian counties. In each locality, the enumerator chose a central starting location and then randomly selected a direction in which to walk, selecting households along that walk. Within each household, the enumerator selected the respondent with the birthday closest to the date of the survey to participate. Respondents who received version A of the survey received the treatment versions of the list experiment measuring welfare and lender coercion and the control version of the survey measuring positive inducements. By contrast, respondents who received version B of the survey received the treatment version of the list for positive inducements and the control version of the survey for the lists on coercion.

We selected a stratified sample of communities with fewer than 10,000 people in three Hungarian counties: Baranya, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (BAZ), and Heves.

Ultimately, 35 percent of our respondents live in Heves, 36 percent in BAZ, and 29 percent in Baranya. In Table 4, we present summary statistics about the distribution of different respondents across the two versions of the questionnaire. We do not find any statistically significant differences in observable characteristics of respondents assigned to the two versions of the survey. The average age of our respondents is fifty-three years old, with 62 percent of our sample comprised of women. We measure income with a binary variable indicating whether the respondent's monthly household income is less than 100,000 HUF (approximately 450 USD). A very large number of voters in our sample (97 percent) believe that their vote is secret.

Before we analyze our results, we need to evaluate the design of the list experiment. Figure 1 presents information about the distribution of the responses for all the lists. The potential for floor and ceiling effects is small, which implies that the lists do provide plausible deniability to respondents who have experienced the sensitive items. Consider first the distribution of responses for the list measuring positive inducements. Out of the 909 respondents in the control group, only 9 percent chose zero items on the list and no respondent chose all three items included in our list. Similarly, the modal response rate to the list of sensitive items was one. The distribution of the control responses for the other lists follows a similar pattern.

We also use a method developed by Blair and Imai to test for design effects.³² Design effects are present when the response of an individual to the list including non-sensitive items changes if the sensitive item is present. Specifically, we test whether the inclusion of the sensitive item changes the responses to the control items in the list. Intuitively, this test assesses whether responses after the addition of the treatment item are larger than responses to the control lists, but by at most one. If either of those conditions is violated, then design effects may drive the difference between treatment and control responses.

We use the standard suggested by Blair and Imai of setting a rejection criteria of $\alpha = 0.05$ in a two-sided test.³³ Because our measured prevalence of the sensitive items is small, the power of the test to pick up negative design effects is quite high. We fail to reject the null hypothesis in the tests for design effects in all four list experiments.

Table 2 displays the overall estimated prevalence of the four types of clientelism that we measured. The results show the mean number of items supported by respondents in the control group and treatment group, respectively. By subtracting the mean number of items of respondents who received the treatment version of the questionnaire from

Table 2 Estimated Incidence of Four Types of Clientelism

N	Control Mean	Treatment Mean	Estimated Incidence	p-value
1817	0.97	1.03	5.3% (1.4%, 9.1%)	0.01
1819	1.02	1.08	5.8% (2.3%, 9.3%)	0.00
1838	1.04	1.11	6.8% (3.1%, 10.5%)	0.00
1834	1.08	1.13	5.6% (2.2%, 9%)	0.00

the mean item of respondents who received the control version of the questionnaire, we obtain the estimate of the incidence of each electoral irregularity.

Overall, we find that the use of clientelism is limited, but the strategies are consistent across the localities in our sample. Across strategies, between 5 and 7 percent of respondents report having experienced one of the four clientelistic strategies that we measured. This prevalence is similar to rates of clientelism in other contexts: Stokes et al. find that 5–7 percent of voters in Argentina and 10–12 percent in Venezuela across multiple surveys reported experiencing vote buying offers.³⁴

The Incidence of Different Forms of Clientelism: Variation across Localities and Individuals

To analyze the variation across localities in the incidence of different clientelistic strategies, we combine our survey data with additional information about the economic and political conditions in different localities. Such information is available from two distinct sources. First, the electoral results collected by the Hungarian Electoral Office for the 2010 local election allow us to operationalize a variety of political conditions across different localities.³⁵ These include the partisanship of the mayor, the incumbency status of the mayor, the majority on the local city council, and the margin of victory of the mayor. In the online appendix, we provide descriptive statistics about the variation on these variables in the localities included in our study.³⁶ To test our hypothesis that the reliance on clientelistic strategies that deploy state resources is influenced by differences in political control, we construct a measure of *Local Control*. The variable is an additive index of indicators that take a value 1 if the locality has a mayor who is an incumbent, a co-partisan with the incumbent Fidesz Party, or is from the same party as the plurality in the local city council.

In addition to these political variables, we used information collected by the Hungarian Statistical Agency to test our second set of hypotheses.³⁷ We use demographic information collected as part of the 2010 census to construct measures of the sizes of the expansion and retrenchment coalitions, respectively. We construct our measure of the *Retrenchment Coalition* as a mean effects index of the two groups that are excluded from access to the benefits of the workfare program: the employed and retirees. By contrast, our measure of the distributive coalition favoring either the policy status quo or the expansion of the current workfare benefits (*Expansion Coalition*) includes the two demographic groups that are likely to be beneficiaries of this program, the unemployed and the Roma. A third variable used in our analysis, a measure of the intensity of conflict in the locality, is an interaction of these two variables (*Social Conflict*).

Finally, we include a variety of locality-level controls. These include measures for the margin of victory of the mayor in the 2010 local election, the population, the poverty rate, and the debt rate of respondents in the locality. Table 3 summarizes the sources for the data used in our empirical analysis.

We examine the individual- and locality-level covariates in the incidence of coercive strategies by using a hierarchical model. Let j subscript the locality and i the individual respondent. We estimate:

Table 3 Variables Used in the Analysis

	Construction of variable	Source
Local control	Additive index of indicators that take the value 1 if the locality has a mayor who is an incumbent, a co-partisan with the incumbent Fidesz Party or from the same party as the plurality in the local city council	Nemzeti Választási Iroda. 2010
Retrenchment Coalition	Mean effects index of the electoral constituency opposing workfare programs (employed and retirees)	Központi Statisztikai Hivatal 2013a, 2013b, 2013c
Expansion Coalition	Mean effects index of the proportion of the pro-workfare constituency in each locality (unemployed and Roma)	Központi Statisztikai Hivatal 2013a, 2013b, 2013c
Social Conflict	Interaction between Retrenchment and Expansion coalition	Központi Statisztikai Hivatal 2013a, 2013b, 2013c
Mayor Margin	Margin of victory of the mayor in the 2010 local election	Nemzeti Választási Iroda. 2010
Population	Number of inhabitants by locality	Központi Statisztikai Hivatal 2013a, 2013b, 2013c
Poverty Rate	Share of population in poverty	Központi Statisztikai Hivatal 2013a, 2013b, 2013c
Debt Rate	Proportion of survey respondents who report being in debt	Survey
Individual controls	Roma, Female, Age, Employed, Unemployed, Retired	Survey

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{TREATMENT LIST}_{ij} + \beta_2 X_j + \beta_3 X_j \times \text{TREATMENT LIST}_{ij} + \beta_4 Z_i + \beta_5 \text{TREATMENT LIST}_{ij} \times Z_i + \alpha_j + \varepsilon_i$$

where $\alpha_j = N(0, \sigma_j)$

The dependent variable Y_{ij} represents the list response for the particular clientelistic strategy. TREATMENT LIST is a variable that takes the value of 1 for those individuals that have received the version of the questionnaire that includes the sensitive item for the relevant list. X_j is a vector of locality-level variables. Z_i is a battery of individual-level characteristics, and ε_i is the error term. In this specification, β_2 is the estimated relationship between the locality-level variables X_j and the incidence of the control items on the list, while β_3 is the estimated relationship between the variables X_j and the sensitive item of interest. The coefficient of interest for our analysis of the locality level variation in the incidence of a particular clientelistic strategy is β_3 .

All models are estimated using a multilevel model with intercepts varying by locality. The coefficients presented are from interactions with the list treatment indicator and can be interpreted as the estimated relationship between the variable and the sensitive item on the list.

The Use of Coercive Strategies

For each of the two coercive strategies measured by our survey, we estimate three different models that test the theoretical predictions outlined above. The first model only includes our main coefficients of interest and the incidence of the clientelistic strategies. The second model adds two additional locality-level variables of interest. The third model includes individual-level covariates measuring the gender, age, ethnicity, and employment status of the respondent. We standardize all continuous variables included in our analysis.

Models 1–3 in Table 4 examine the correlates of the incidence of public coercion. Our first hypothesis was that the incidence of this strategy would be higher in localities where candidates' access to political resources is higher. As such, we expected to find a positive relationship between the index of local political control and the incidence of coercion. We find little support for this hypothesis. In Figure D.1 in the online appendix, we further disaggregate the measure of political control into different sub-indicators, using the specifications in Column 2. There is no evidence that any of the individual measures of political control are associated with higher prevalence of coercive clientelism. Taken together, these results suggest that local political control has little effect on the incidence of welfare coercion.

By contrast, we do find that indicators of social conflict are related to the incidence of coercive clientelism in systematic ways. We hypothesized that in localities where the size of the electoral coalition supporting the retrenchment of the workfare program is large, candidates would use coercive forms of clientelism to signal to this constituency their opposition to the workfare program. We find support for this hypothesis. An increase in the size of the retrenchment coalition is associated with an increase in the incidence of welfare coercion of seven to nine percentage points. This relationship does not seem to depend on the size of the Expansion Coalition: there is no evidence of a significant relationship between our measure of social conflict (the interaction between the expansion and retrenchment coalition) and the incidence of policy coercion.

Models 4–6 examine the correlates of private electoral coercion. We either expected to see no relationship between local political control and private forms of clientelism, or a negative relationship if public and private clientelism are substitutes. We find that the measure of political control is unrelated to the incidence of private electoral coercion. We do, however, find that indicators of social conflict are related to the incidence of private coercion. In this case, the overall size of the *Retrenchment Coalition* has no relationship with private coercion, but the interaction of the *Retrenchment* and *Expansion Coalitions* is positively and significantly related to private

Table 4 Correlates of Negative Forms of Clientelism in Hungary

	Dependent variable:					
	Policy Coercion			Economic Coercion		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Retrenchment Coalition	0.07** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Expansion Coalition	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Retrenchment × Expansion (Social Conflict)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03*** (0.02)	0.03*** (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
Local Control	0.004 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.002 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Poverty Rate	0.27 (0.19)	0.26 (0.19)	0.28 (0.19)	0.37* (0.19)	0.34* (0.19)	0.37* (0.19)
Debt Rate	0.03*** (0.02)	0.04*** (0.02)	0.04*** (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Mayor Margin		-0.001 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)		0.001 (0.02)	-0.004 (0.02)
Population		-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)		-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Roma			-0.04 (0.04)			0.09*** (0.04)
Female			0.02 (0.03)			0.03 (0.03)
Age			-0.02 (0.03)			-0.04 (0.03)
Employed			-0.08 (0.06)			0.08 (0.06)
Unemployed			-0.04			0.07

(Continued)

Table 4 (continued)

	Dependent variable:					
	Policy Coercion			Economic Coercion		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Retired			(0.06) -0.03 (0.08)			(0.06) 0.14* (0.08)
Direct Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1779	1779	1672	1794	1794	1688
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1190.02	1219.5	1170.15	1228.51	1259.72	1185.86

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Standard errors in parentheses.

Models are estimated using a multilevel model with intercepts varying by locality. The coefficients shown are from interactions with the list treatment indicator. Local Control is an additive index of indicators that take a value of 1 if the locality has a mayor who is an incumbent, a co-partisan with the national executive, or from the same party as the plurality in the city council. Retrenchment Coalition is the average of the standardized proportions of the anti-workfare constituency: the employed and retirees. Expansion Coalition is the average of the standardized proportions of the pro-workfare constituency: the unemployed and Roma. Retrenchment X Expansion is the interaction of the pro- and anti-workfare constituencies. Poverty Rate is the proportion of inhabitants who are below the poverty line. Debt Rate is the proportion of survey respondents by locality who reported being in debt. Mayor Margin is the margin of victory of the mayor. Population is the population size. Roma, Female, Age, Employed, Unemployed, Retired, Debt, and Poor are individual-level variables coded from our surveys. All but Age and Poor are binary. All continuous variables are Standardized.

coercion. In other words, when the *Expansion Coalition* is large, an increase in the size of the *Retrenchment Coalition* is associated with an increase in the level of private coercion.

We also find logical relationships between some of our control variables and the incidence of both public and private coercion. More voters were likely to experience public and private coercion in localities with higher levels of poverty and where our survey found a higher proportion of respondents in debt. The relationship between the poverty rate and the level of public coercion is not statistically significant, but is positive and similar in magnitude to the relationship between the poverty rate and private coercion. In terms of individual covariates, the Roma and retirees are more likely to experience electoral coercion by moneylenders.

Clientelistic Strategies based on Positive Inducements

The results in Table 5 estimate the individual- and locality-level covariates in the incidence of clientelistic strategies premised on positive inducements: vote-buying, or private favors, and of policy favors. Models 1 through 3 examine the incidence in the use of vote-buying strategies. Compared to the other clientelistic strategies examined in this study, vote-buying does not seem to be precisely targeted. Consider first the results concerning local political control. The measure of political control is again not statistically related to the incidence of vote-buying. Similarly, and in contrast to the results on coercive strategies, we find no evidence of a relationship between vote buying and our measures of distributional conflict. Both variables measuring the size of the *Welfare Retrenchment* and *Welfare Expansion* coalitions have little association with the incidence of vote-buying. In line with our theoretical prediction, the interaction of the *Workfare Expansion* and *Workfare Retrenchment* coalitions is negatively associated with the incidence of vote-buying, but is only weakly statistically significant. Ultimately, as the interaction term is not consistently statistically significant, we conclude that there is no systematic relationship between the variables measuring social conflict and the incidence of vote-buying.

Models 4 to 6 report the analysis of the use of policy favors. We again find little support for our first hypothesis, which considered that the use of state-based clientelism would be more likely in localities where local control is higher. We find no relationship between the local control index and the incidence of favors. The online appendix shows that none of the sub-indicators of the local control index are systematically related to the incidence of policy favors.

We do, however, find support for the informational or supply-side factors, which led us to predict that the incidence of public favors would be higher in localities where distributional conflict over the allocation of anti-poverty benefits is low. The incidence of policy favors is higher when the coalition favoring expansion is high. In contrast to our predictions, policy favors are also more likely when the retrenchment coalition is large. Importantly, the interaction of the two coalitions—our proxy for social

Table 5 Correlates of Positive Forms of Clientelism in Hungary

	Dependent variable:					
	Vote Buying			Policy Favors		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Retrenchment Coalition	0.003 (0.04)	0.004 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)
Expansion Coalition	0.005 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)
Retrenchment × Expansion (Social Conflict)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.03*** (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)
Local Control	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Poverty Rate	-0.10 (0.21)	-0.08 (0.21)	-0.02 (0.22)	-0.04 (0.2)	-0.05 (0.2)	-0.07 (0.2)
Debt Rate	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Mayor Margin		-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)		0.005 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Population		0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)		-0.004 (0.02)	-0.002 (0.02)
Roma			-0.01 (0.05)			-0.04 (0.04)
Female			0.01 (0.04)			0.05 (0.03)
Age			0.01 (0.03)			0.01 (0.03)
Employed			-0.04 (0.07)			-0.11* (0.06)
Unemployed			0.003			-0.06

(Continued)

Table 5 (continued)

	Dependent variable:					
	Vote Buying			Policy Favors		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Retired			(0.07)			(0.06)
Direct Effects	✓	✓	-0.05 (0.09)	✓	✓	-0.09 (0.08)
Observations	1798	1798	1691	1777	1777	1669
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1592.23	1620.5	1549.24	1258.95	1287.12	1190.75

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Standard errors in parentheses.

Models are estimated using a multilevel model with intercepts varying by locality. The coefficients shown are from interactions with the list treatment indicator. Local Control is an additive index of indicators that take a value of 1 if the locality has a mayor who is an incumbent, a co-partisan with the national executive, or from the same party as the plurality in the city council. Retrenchment Coalition is the average of the standardized proportions of the anti-workfare constituency: the employed and retirees. Expansion Coalition is the average of the standardized proportions of the pro-workfare constituency: the unemployed and Roma. Retrenchment X Expansion is the interaction of the pro- and anti-workfare constituencies. Poverty Rate is the proportion of inhabitants who are below the poverty line. Debt Rate is the proportion of survey respondents by locality who reported being in debt. Mayor Margin is the margin of victory of the mayor. Population is the population size. Roma, Female, Age, Employed, Unemployed, Retired, Debt, and Poor are individual-level variables coded from our surveys. All but Age and Poor are binary. All continuous variables are standardized.

conflict—is negatively and significantly associated with the incidence of policy favors. Substantively, these results imply that increases in the size of the coalition favoring social policy expansion leads to increases in the incidence of policy favors when the size of the coalition favoring retrenchment is low. However, these effects disappear or become slightly negative in localities where the retrenchment coalition takes high values. We interpret this as meaning that when only one of these groups of poor voters is large, the electoral costs of using policy favors are relatively low and may even be seen positively by poor voters who are looking for candidates who will use policy to help their particular group. However, when both of these groups are large, welfare policy is contested, and disfavored voters like retirees and the working poor may be relatively critical of candidates who use positive forms of clientelism. In contrast to the coercive forms of clientelism, we do not see very strong relationships between our control variables and the incidence of vote buying or public policy favors.

Overall, our findings lend stronger support to the supply-side explanations that focus on how different types of voters would interpret the policy signals of clientelism, as compared to the demand-side factors focused on the ability to politicize state resources. The incidence of positive and negative forms of electoral clientelism is correlated in systematic ways with locality-level variables that measure the likelihood of distributional conflict between groups of low-income voters over the distribution of anti-poverty benefits. If the opportunities for such conflict are high, we posit that politicians will find coercive forms of clientelism electorally appealing because it will be more easily forgiven by disgruntled voters. By contrast, clientelistic strategies premised on positive inducements are more electorally attractive in localities where the distributional conflict between groups of low-income voters over the allocation of social policy benefits is low. Explanations that stress the importance of access to state resources—through copartisanship with the national party or long-term incumbency—fare less well in explaining the incidence of different forms of clientelism.

Conclusion

In this article, we have documented the incidence of a variety of clientelistic strategies in Hungary's parliamentary elections held in May 2014. Using list experiments, a survey methodology that allows us to measure sensitive political phenomena, and semi-structured qualitative interviews, we documented the existence of four distinct forms of clientelism. Two of these clientelistic strategies (welfare coercion and welfare favors) politicize state resources. In the case of other clientelistic strategies (vote-buying and private coercion), candidates use private resources and brokers who are not state employees to incentivize voters to support a candidate.

Our article makes several contributions to the broader literature examining clientelistic exchanges. First, our approach demonstrates that it is fruitful to disaggregate among different forms of electoral clientelism. We propose a typology of clientelistic strategies that is both empirically and normatively important. The distinction between

forms of clientelism based on state versus private resources is important because state-based clientelism may have more pernicious effects on state capacity and attitudes towards democracy. The distinction between positive versus negative forms of clientelism is important because threats may be more powerful incentives and because coercion is a much more fundamental violation of voters' rights than a freely entered positive exchange.

These findings contribute to a growing literature that seeks to explain where clientelistic appeals emerge and persist. Contrary to much of the existing literature, we do not find any evidence that access to important political institutions can explain the choice between clientelism based on public versus private resources. We can think of two reasons why control of local institutions might not matter in Hungary as it seems to in other cases. First, Hungary has a large number of independent mayors who actually affiliate with parties to act as brokers during national elections, so it is hard to accurately code co-partisanship with the national executive or city council. Second, the null result may be explained by the fact that clientelism is not used in isolation. While we find that the distinction between programmatic and clientelistic strategies is more porous than previously theorized, it is also possible that control of local political institutions creates advantages in programmatic campaigns that then reduce the need for clientelism. We hope that future research might unpack how politicians substitute between clientelistic, programmatic, and charismatic appeals in different conditions.

This article also contributes to the recent literature on clientelism by showing that social conditions in a locality influence politicians' electoral incentives to choose among clientelistic strategies. More specifically, we show that the intensity of conflict among low-income voters over the allocation of social policy benefits is related to the prevalence of electoral coercion relative to clientelistic strategies premised on positive inducements. Coercive clientelistic strategies should be electorally attractive in localities where the size of the population opposed to the existing anti-poverty programs is large. By contrast, the use of welfare favors should be an attractive electoral strategy in localities where a large share of low-income voters demands and favors the expansion of anti-poverty programs. To our knowledge, this is the first study pointing to the importance of such distributional conflict among poor voters in affecting the choice among different forms of clientelism. Such "poor versus poor" conflict is salient in many other fragile democracies and may be similarly related to the strategies used by candidates.

NOTES

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A: Wording of the lists in the questionnaire

First, I am going to ask you some questions regarding politics.

I am going to read some statements about events that happened or could have happened at times of elections. Please recall the elections held on April 6, 2014, and tell me how many of these events happened in your locality. You do not need to tell which ones happened, only how many. With the help of this answer sheet, please follow the statements I am reading. For each question, I am going to tell you which answer sheet you will have to look at.

I am going to read some statements about events that happened or could have happened during elections. Please recall the elections held on April 6, 2014, and tell me how many of these events happened in your locality. You do not need to tell which ones happened exactly, only how many.

- Several candidates visited our locality.
- One of the candidates promised to protect animal rights.
- None of the candidates visited our locality.
- **I was worried that a family member would lose employment in the public works program if I voted for the wrong candidate (sensitive item).**

0 – None

1 – One

2 – Two

3 – Three

4 – Four

88 – Don't know

99 – No answer

I am going to read some statements about events that happened or could have happened during elections. Please recall the elections held on April 6, 2014, and tell me how many of these events happened in your locality. You do not need to tell which ones happened exactly, only how many.

- There were Fidesz posters in my neighborhood.
- None of the parties had posters in my neighborhood.
- **I expected a favor from the mayors' men if I voted well (sensitive item)**
- I got into a fight over politics

0 – None

1 – One

- 2 – Two
- 3 – Three
- 88 – Don't know
- 99 – No answer

I am going to read some statements about events that happened or could have happened during elections. Please recall the elections held on April 6, 2014, and tell me how many of these events happened in your locality. You do not need to tell which ones happened exactly, only how many.

- Most people rushed to vote at very early hours of the morning.
- People went to vote at different times of the day.
- **I worried that I would owe money to my creditor if I voted badly (Sensitive item)**
- The election commission did not have enough ballots for every person who wanted to vote

- 0 – None
- 1 – One
- 2 – Two
- 3 – Three
- 4 – Four
- 88 – Don't know
- 99 – No answer

I am going to read some statements about events that happened or could have happened during elections. Please recall the elections held on April 6, 2014, and tell me how many of these events happened in your locality. You do not need to tell which ones happened exactly, only how many.

- I saw some Jobbik posters in our locality.
- **During the last elections, I was offered a gift, drink or food in exchange for my vote (sensitive question)**
- I did not see any Jobbik posters.
- I met one of the candidates also in person.

- 0 – None
- 1 – One
- 2 – Two
- 3 – Three
- 88 – Don't know
- 99 – No answer

Appendix B: List of Qualitative Interviews

Loc_ID	Int_Nr	Int_Date	Gender	Age	Ethnicity	Occupation
Z.	1	7/21/15	F	40-59	Hungarian	Voter
Z.	2	7/21/15	F	18-39	Hungarian	Public work employee
Z.	3	7/27/15	M	18-39	Hungarian	Family member of the former mayor
Z.	4	7/27/15	F	18-39	Hungarian	Voter
Z.	5	7/27/15	M	40-59	Hungarian	Voter
Z.	6	7/27/15	F	18-39	Hungarian	Voter
Z.	7	7/22/15	M	18-39	Hungarian	Current mayor, Independent
Z.	8	7/22/15	M	18-39	Hungarian	Voter
Z.	9	7/22/15	M	60+	Hungarian	Voter
Z.	10	7/22/15	M	60+	Roma	Voter
Z.	11	7/23/15	M	40-59	Roma	Broker
Z.	12	7/23/15	F	40-59	Hungarian	Voter
Z.	13	7/23/15	F	40-59	Hungarian	Broker
Z.	14	7/23/15	M	60+	Hungarian	Former mayor
Z.	15	7/23/15	M	40-59	Roma	Representative of Roma minority in municipality
Z.	16	7/24/15	F	40-59	Roma	Representative of Roma minority in municipality
Z.	17	7/24/15	M	40-59	Roma	Representative of Roma minority in municipality
Y.	1	23/10/2015	M	40-59	Roma	Employee of municipality
Y.	2	23/10/2015	F		Roma	Employee in the public works program
Y.	3	24/10/2015	M	60+	Hungarian	Former candidate for mayoral position
Y.	4	24/10/2015	F	40-59	Roma	Employee in public works program
Y.	5	24/10/2015	M	60+	Hungarian	Farmer
X.	1	7/22/15	F	40-59	Hungarian	School director
X.	2	7/22/15	M	60+	Hungarian	Member in village council. Former deputy mayor
X.	3	7/23/15	F	40-59	Hungarian	Employee in local administration
X.	4	7/23/15	F	18-39	Hungarian	Head of social policy department in municipality

(Continued)

(continued)

Loc_ID	Int_Nr	Int_Date	Gender	Age	Ethnicity	Occupation
X.	5	7/23/15	M	40-59	Hungarian	Coordinator of public works program in the municipality
X.	6	7/23/15	M	40-59	Hungarian	Former member of city council, Opposition
X.	7	7/25/15	M	18-39	Roma	Member of Roma Minority council
X.	8	7/25/15	F	40-59	Roma	President of Roma Minority Council
X.	9	7/26/15	M	40-59	Roma	Former leader of public works program
E.	1	7/29/15	F	40-59	Hungarian	Former deputy mayor
E.	2	7/29/15	M	40-59	Hungarian	Head of social policy department in municipality
E.	3	7/29/15	M	40-59	Roma	President of Roma Minority Council
E.	4	7/29/15	F	40-59	Roma	Employee in public works program
E.	5	7/31/16	F	40-59	Hungarian	Member of village council
E.	6	7/31/15	F	40-59	Hungarian	Head of social policy department in municipality
E.	7	8/1/15	F	40-59	Hungarian	Mayor
F.	1	7/28/15	F	18-39	Hungarian	Employee of municipality
F.	2	7/28/15	F	40-59	Roma	Employee in public institution
F.	3	7/28/15	F	40-59	Roma	Employee in public works program
F.	4	7/28/15	F	18-39	Roma	Employee in public works program
F.	5	7/29/15	M	40-59	Hungarian	Employee in public works program
F.	6	7/29/15	F	18-39	Hungarian	Employee of municipality
F.	7	7/29/15	M	40-59	Roma	Mayor of locality
F.	8	7/29/15	F	18-39	Hungarian	Employee in public works program, opponent of mayor
F.	9	7/30/15	M	60+	Hungarian	Former mayor
F.	10	7/30/15	M	40-59	Hungarian	Employee in agriculture, Supporter of mayor
F.	11	7/30/15	M	40-59	Hungarian	Employee in agriculture
W.	1	7/16/15	M	18-39	Hungarian	Employee in forestry
W.	2	7/16/15	M	18-39	Roma	Employee in forestry
W.	3	7/16/15	M	18-39	Roma	Member of village council

(Continued)

(continued)

Loc_ID	Int_Nr	Int_Date	Gender	Age	Ethnicity	Occupation
W.	4	7/16/15	M	60+	Roma	Retired, Former employee of municipality and former broker of mayor
W.	5	7/18/15	M	60+	Hungarian	Retiree, Broker for current mayor
W.	6	7/31/15	W	60+	Hungarian	Teacher at local school
W.	7	8/20/15	W	60+	Hungarian	Retired, Former elementary school teacher and representative in local city council
W.	8	8/20/15	R	60+	Roma	Representative of Roma minority in municipality, Former broker
W.	9	8/20/15	R	60+	Hungarian	Retired, Former broker for previous mayor
B.	1	4/7/15	W	60+	Hungarian	Retired
B.	2	7/7/15	M	60+	Hungarian	Employee in local administration
B.	3	7/8/15	M	40-59	Hungarian	Former council member, now in opposition to mayor
B.	4	7/10/15	W	40-59	Hungarian	School teacher
B.	5	7/11/15	M	60+	Hungarian	Former member of city council
B.	6	7/13/15	M	40-59	Hungarian	Former member of city council
B.	7	7/13/15	M	60+	Hungarian	Former member of the city council
G.	1	7/21/05	M	60+	Hungarian	Former mayor of locality, broker
G.	2	7/22/15	F	60+	Hungarian	Employee in local city council, Broker
G.	3	7/22/15	F	18-39	Hungarian	Entrepreneur
G.	4	7/23/15	M	40-59	Hungarian	Entrepreneur
G.	5	7/23/15	M	40-59	Hungarian	Entrepreneur, former member of city council
G.	6	7/24/15	F	40-59	Hungarian	Employee of local administration
G.	7	7/25/15	F	60+	Hungarian	Retired
C.	1	7/2/15	F	40-59	Hungarian	Self-employed
C.	2	7/3/15	F	60+	Hungarian	Retired,
C.	3	7/4/15	F	60+	Hungarian	Self-employed
C.	4	7/5/15	F	60+	Hungarian	Former economist in governmental office
C.	5	7/6/15	M	18-39	Hungarian	Employee in local administration
C.	6	7/7/15	F	60+	Hungarian	Retiree
C.	7	7/9/15	M	40-59	Hungarian	Representative in city council
C.	8	7/12/15	M	40-59	Hungarian	Employee in the municipality, former candidate for mayor, broker
C.	9	7/15/15	M	40-59	Hungarian	Deputy mayor

(Continued)

(continued)

Loc_ID	Int_Nr	Int_Date	Gender	Age	Ethnicity	Occupation
V.	1	10/10/15	M	40-59	Roma	Representative of Roma minority in municipality
V.	2	10/10/15	M	40-59	Roma	Former employee in public works program
V.	3	10/11/15	M	40-59	Roma	Voter, unemployed
V.	4	10/11/15	W	40-59	Hungarian	Retired
V.	5	10/11/15	W	40-59	Hungarian	Employee in municipality
V.	6	10/22/15	W	40-59	Hungarian	Employee in municipality
V.	7	10/22/15	M	18-39	Roma	Employee in public works program
V.	8	10/22/15	M	40-59	Hungarian	Local notary
U.	1	8/21/15	M	40-59	Roma	Broker
U.	2	8/21/15	W	60+	Roma	Employee in municipality
U.	3	8/22/05	M	18-39	Roma	Employee in municipality
U.	4	8/22/15	M	18-39	Roma	Representative of opposition in municipality government
U.	5	8/22/15	W	18-39	Roma	Teacher at local school
U.	6	8/24/15	M	18-39	Roma	Employee in municipality, relative of powerful family who controls economic activity in the locality
U.	7	8/24/15	M	18-39	Roma	Voter, actively involved in politics
U.	8	8/25/15	M	40-59	Hungarian	Employee in municipality
U.	9	8/25/15	M	60+	Hungarian	Former mayor
U.	10	8/25/15	M	40-59	Roma	Owner of large agricultural enterprise
U.	11	8/26/15	M	60+	Roma	Former candidate for mayoral position
U.	12	8/26/15	M	40-59	Roma	Previously employed in workfare program, now without employment
U.	13	8/26/16	M	40-59	Roma	Pressured voter excluded from social assistance benefits
T.	1	9/21/15	M	40-59	Roma	Employee in municipality
T.	2	9/21/15	M	60+	Roma	Retired
T.	3	9/22/15	M	40-59	Hungarian	Employee in municipality
T.	4	9/22/15	W	60+	Hungarian	Employee in municipality
T.	5	9/23/15	M	60+	Hungarian	Former mayoral candidate; holds public position in municipality
T.	6	9/23/15	W	40-59	Hungarian	Director of local organization
T.	7	9/24/05	M	40-59	Roma	Employee in municipality
S.	1	10/23/15	M	40-59	Roma	Employee in municipality

(Continued)

(continued)

Loc_ID	Int_Nr	Int_Date	Gender	Age	Ethnicity	Occupation
S.	2	10/23/15	W	40-59	Roma	Public works employee
S.	3	10/24/15	M	60+	Hungarian	Former mayoral candidate
S.	4	10/24/15	W	40-59	Roma	Public works employee
S.	5	10/24/15	M	60+	Hungarian	Farmer

Appendix C: Tests of List Validity

Table C.3 Test of Balance Results

	Version A Mean	Version B Mean	p-value	N
Female	60%	64%	0.05	1860
Roma	25%	26%	0.57	1802
Poor	45%	44%	0.66	1635
Age	53.22	52.93	0.72	1808
Fidesz Supporter	50%	51%	0.52	1388
Secret Ballot ¹	97%	95%	0.19	1337

Table C.4 Descriptive Statistics on Locality-Level Variation of Variables Included in Our Study

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	N
Fidesz Mayor	0.44	0.50	87
Divided City Hall	0.29	0.46	86
Divided City Council	0.53	0.50	85
Incumbent	0.61	0.49	87
Percent Unemployed	41.8	5.4	87
Percent Employed	31.6	6.40	87
Percent Inactive	33.9	5.37	87
Percent Roma	14.6	13.5	87

Sources: For political variables: Nemzeti Választási Iroda. Various publications
For economic and social variables: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal. 2013a, 2013b, 2013c;
Évi Népszámlálás. Területi adatok. Pécs: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal.

Appendix D: Additional Analyses

Figure D.1 Results Disaggregating the Local Control Index







Figure 4 Access to state resources and economic coercion



Vote-buying



Welfare favors



NOTES

1. This question was only asked of respondents who said they had voted.